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THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT-WHERE THE FOURTH 
CIRCUIT WENT WRONG IN SHALIEHSABOU V. HEBREW HOME OF 
GREATER WASHINGTON. JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF FAIR LABOR 
STANDARDS ACT EXEMPTIONS TO INCLUDE MINISTERIAL 
EMPLOYEES 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine being an employee who works at least forty hours 
each week, whose duties require specialized training, but who is not 
entitled to a minimum wage or overtime pay. If you live within the 
jurisdiction of the Fourth Circuit, you could experience this very 
problem. In a recent decision, l the Fourth Circuit held that protec­
tions afforded by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA")2 
do not apply to particular employees of religious organizations. 
The implications of this holding and its persuasive effect are far­
reaching, as nearly 1.5 million people in the United States are em­
ployed by non-profit religious organizations.3 The FLSA was en­
acted for the specific purpose of protecting employees from gross 
inequalities in the workplace.4 Although exemptions from the 
Act's protection have decreased over time,S the number of employ­
ees left unprotected from wage and hour inequality is still high. 
Prior to 1938, when Congress enacted the FLSA, employers 
were not required under federal law to provide fair labor protection 
to employees.6 The FLSA was intended to be a far-reaching piece 
of legislation that would establish standards to eradicate poor work­
ing conditions and inequality, which were leading to labor disputes.7 
1. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 
2004), reh'g en bane denied, 369 F.3d 797 (4th Cir. 2004). 
2. 29 U.s.c. §§ 201-219 (2000). 
3. See The Foundation Center, Frequently Asked Questions, http://fdncenter.org! 
learnlfaqslhtml/employed.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2006). 
4. Seth D. Harris, Conceptions of Fairness and The Fair Labor Standards Act, 18 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 19, 98-99 (2000). 
5. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Aer 160-61 (Ellen C. Keams et al. eds., 1999). 
6. Id. at 2. In 1938, the FLSA established fair labor protections, including mini­
mum wage and overtime regulations, and severe restrictions on child labor. Harris, 
supra note 4, at 15. 
7. Harris, supra note 4, at 20-22; see also THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Aer, 
supra note 5, at 11-12. Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938 to combat both child labor 
and great inequality in the workforce. Id. at 13-15. The Act set standards for minimum 
wage, maximum hours, and child labor. ld. at 15. 
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In recent years, however, citizens have begun to take the protec­
tions provided by the FLSA, and the Act itself, for granted.s 
The emergence of federal fair labor standards gave rise to a 
wide array of questions of meaning and application.9 Should a re­
ligious organization be compelled to pay its employees minimum 
wage and overtime pay, or would the government be overstepping 
its constitutional bounds1o by imposing such a mandate? Should 
the exemptions that apply to members of the clergy also apply to 
janitors and kitchen staff employed by religious organizations? The 
judiciary and the legislature have grappled with these questions for 
decades. l1 Consequently, legal repercussions of the Act are not 
clear and they now encompass an evolving body of law for the 
courts to interpret. 
This Note focuses on the Fourth Circuit decision in Shalieh­
sabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Washington, Inc., which raises 
the issue of whether the FLSA provides a ministerial exemption in 
any circumstance and whether such an exemption would be similar 
in scope to the ministerial exemption recognized under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII").12 
In an effort to frame the issue in Shaliehsabou, Part I provides 
historical justifications for and the legislative history of the FLSA. 
Additionally, this section describes exemptions under the FLSA 
and Title VII. There is divisive judicial debate concerning the use 
8. "Having lived under the [Fair Labor Standards] Act for all of these years, the 
nation has begun to take for granted the principles upon which the Act is based." THE 
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Aer, supra note 5, at 2. 
9. Id. at 16-17. Nearly each year since its enactment, amendments to the FLSA 
have been a topic of legislative initiative. Id. This Note will particularly address how 
the FLSA should be applied to workers employed by religious organizations. 
10. The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America 
states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CaNsT. amend. I, d. 1. This Note considers 
whether Congress's requiring a religious employer to pay a minimum wage and over­
time pay to employees would violate the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. 
11. See, e.g., Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 
(1985); Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church Corp., 210 F.2d 879 (7th CiT. 1954); 112 
CONGo REc. 11360, 11371 (1966). 
12. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2 (2000). Generally, Title VII prohibits discrimination in 
employment. Id. However, it also provides an exception: 
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this [subchapter] ... it shall not be an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees 
... on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances 
where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification 
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or 
enterprise .... 
42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(e). 
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of Title VII in construing potential exemptions under the FLSA. 
The main contention turns on whether application of the FLSA to 
ministerial employees violates the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment in the same way that application of Title VII does. 
Part II of this Note discusses the relevant case law underlying 
the Shaliehsabou court's reasoning, first looking at Title VII cases 
and then FLSA cases. Additionally, the main points of the Shalieh­
sabou majority and dissenting opinions are explained to clarify the 
legal contentions concerning a potential ministerial exemption to 
the FLSA. 
Part III provides a legal analysis of the proposed ministerial 
exemption, particularly focusing on the dissenting opinion provided 
by Judge Luttig in Shaliehsabou. Essentially, this section argues 
that Congress did not intend to create a ministerial exemption from 
the FLSA and that such an exemption cannot be reconciled with 
past Supreme Court decisions or the First Amendment's Religion 
Clauses. 
Admittedly, the Supreme Court historically has been hesitant 
to place governmental restrictions on religious organizations.13 In 
particular circumstances, however, the Court has required religious 
organizations to abide by the terms of the FLSA.14 Moreover, the 
Court has never examined a case factually similar to Shaliehsabou, 
where the Fourth Circuit recognized a ministerial exemption under 
the FLSA.15 This Note will therefore put aside the question of 
whether the Supreme Court is likely to interfere with religious or­
ganizations' autonomy with respect to wages. The primary objec­
tive of this Note is to highlight the shortcomings in a line of 
reasoning that began in the Department of Labor and resulted in 
the Shaliehsabou decision-this goal can be accomplished without 
speculation as to whether the Supreme Court would agree with 
Judge Luttig's proposed outcome in Shaliehsabou. 
13. Oliver S. Thomas, The Power To Destroy: The Eroding Constitutional Argu­
ments For Church Tax Exemption And The Practical Effect On Churches, 22 CUMBo L. 
REV. 605, 611 (1992); see, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity V. United States, 143 U.S. 457 
(1892) (finding that a statute prohibiting importation of foreign labor did not apply to a 
religious organization). 
14. See, e.g., Tony and Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 290 (holding that a relig­
ious foundation was required to comply with the FLSA). 
15. Arguably, the Court will undertake a fact-based inquiry when deciding 
whether to place restrictions on a religious organization. 
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I. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr AND TITLE VII 
In Shaliehsabou, the Fourth Circuit not only recognized a min­
isterial exemption from the FLSA, but also held that this exemption 
was similar in scope to the ministerial exemption from Title VII.16 
In order to consider the legitimacy and the implications of this 
holding, it is first necessary to consider the historical context lead­
ing to the enactment of the FLSA, the Act's legislative history, and 
the recognized exemptions under both the FLSA and Title VII. 
A. Legislative History of the FLSA 
In 1938, Congress attempted to combat inequity in the 
workforce by setting minimum standards for wages, hours, and 
child labor in the FLSA.17 Prior to the enactment of the FLSA, 
societal conflict raged between proponents of absolute freedom of 
contract in the employment setting and those who insisted on 
remediation of the disproportionate balance of bargaining power 
between employers and employees.18 At the height of the Indus­
trial Revolution, the 1920s saw a shift in population from rural 
farmlands to towns and urban areas, resulting in a dramatic in­
crease in employment throughout the 1920s and 1930s.19 This in­
crease, along with the mechanization of industry, led to far greater 
productivity.20 But the increase in number of persons seeking em­
ployment and new-found industrial efficiency meant that workers 
possessed significantly less bargaining power than did their employ­
ers.21 To combat wage and hour inequities, as well as the evil of 
child labor, Congress began to enact legislation in particular indus­
16. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 369 F.3d 299, 305-07 
(4th Cir. 2004). "The ministerial exception operates to exempt from the coverage of 
various employment laws the employment relationships between religious institutions 
and their ministers." Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 247 F. 
Supp. 2d 728, 730 (D. Md. 2003), affd, 363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 2004). For further discus­
sion of the constitutionally compelled exemption to Title VII, see infra Part I.c. 
17. Harris, supra note 4, at 19-23 (referring to 29 U.S.c. §§ 201-219 (2000»; see 
also William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century: Every­
thing Old is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 270 (2002). 
18. Harris, supra note 4, at 21. Harris notes that "[f]rom the demise of slavery 
through the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938, participants in the debate 
over fairness in wages increasingly accepted the premise that individual workers had 
significantly less bargaining power in the labor market than employers." Id at 20. 
19. Id. at 97-98. This shift was partially due to a rural depression and the rela­
tively high pay of urban jobs. Id.; see also IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS: A 
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1920-1933 48 (1960). 
20. Harris, supra note 4, at 98. 
21. Id. at 98-99. 
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tries, but "was not yet prepared to reach out to regulate the condi­
tions of employment in general."22 Even before Congress 
attempted to address the problem of inequity in the workforce, 
many states had taken legislative action in this area.23 But by the 
mid-1930s it was evident that federal law was necessary to establish 
nationwide fair labor standards.24 
In 1937, President Roosevelt sent a message to Congress press­
ing it to enact such a statute.25 President Roosevelt stated, 
Our nation ... should be able to devise ways and means of insur­
ing to all our able-bodied working men and women a fair day's 
pay for a fair day's work. A self-supporting and self-respecting 
democracy can plead no justification for the existence of child 
labor, no economic reason for chiseling workers' wages or 
stretching workers' hours. 
Enlightened business is learning that competition ought not 
to cause bad social consequences which inevitably react upon the 
profits of business itself .... Government must have some control 
over maximum hours, minimum wages, the evil of child labor, 
and the exploitation of unorganized labor.26 
In response, the 75th Congress held a number of hearings and, 
22. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Aer, supra note 5, at 5. In 1868, Congress 
passed a statute mandating an eight-hour maximum work day for government workers. 
Yet, in effect, this statute did not stop workers from performing overtime work. Id. at 3­
4. In 1915, Congress specifically addressed problems in the shipping industry by enact­
ing maximum hour restrictions, along with restrictions on overworking sailors and mini­
mum food and drink allowances for sailors. Id. at 4-5. In 1935, Congress imposed 
maximum hour standards on the Motor Carriers to ensure public safety in this industry. 
Id. at 5-6. In 1931, Congress enacted the Davis-Bacon Act, which required federal con­
tractors to pay employees according to the wage that prevailed among employees en­
gaged in a similar line of work in that region. Id. at 6-7. The Walsh-Healey 
Government Contracts Act mandates specific working conditions and wages for work­
ers under contract with the federal government. Id. at 7-8. In 1933, Congress passed the 
National Industrial Recovery Act allowing the president to control maximum hours, 
minimum wages, and any other employment conditions in an industry that was engag­
ing in "unfair competition" or unfair practices. Id. at 8-9. 
23. Id. at 9. Some state statutes set a monetary minimum wage while others ap­
pointed a commission to do so. Id. at 10. Ironically, state minimum wage laws typically 
"applied only to women and children, whose freedom to contract was already limited by 
their 'weakness' and inferiority in society." Id. at 10-11; see also West Coast Hotel Co. 
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 394-95 (1937) (holding that certain legislation that was designed 
to protect women was not necessary to protect men). 
24. Harris, supra note 4, at 20; see also THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Aer, supra 
note 5, at 11-12. 
25. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Aer, supra note 5, at 11-12 
26. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, WAGES AND HOURS: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESI­
DENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. No. 75-255, at 2 (1937). 
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after the proposal of various pieces of legislation in both the House 
and the Senate, the House and Senate Labor Committees issued a 
joint statementP The statement proposed that the "maintenance 
of substandard labor conditions" by even a few employers within an 
industry negatively affects interstate commerce.28 In the end, repu­
table employers were being unfairly disadvantaged because low 
wages and poor working conditions often resulted in dissatisfied 
employees and labor disputes.29 States were powerless to address 
the issue because goods produced under substandard labor condi­
tions were flowing freely to states that attempted to enforce fair 
labor laws.3D The joint committee concluded, 
[T]he existence in industries engaged in commerce, or in the pro­
duction of goods for commerce, of labor conditions detrimental 
to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary 
for health, efficiency and general well-being, required immediate 
action to correct, and as rapidly as possible to eliminate, condi­
tions in such industries without substantially curtailing employ­
ment or earning power.31 
After much debate and several legislative proposals, the FLSA 
was adopted on June 25, 1938, establishing minimum wage, over­
time, and child labor provisions.32 The FLSA protections do not, 
however, reach every employed person. Indeed, as this Note will 
discuss in the following section, Congress has carved out numerous 
exemptions from the FLSA. 
B. FLSA Coverage and Exemptions 
Congress intended the FLSA to be far-reaching in order to 
combat a broad societal problem.33 To benefit from the protections 
afforded by the FLSA, a bona fide employment relationship must 
exist between an employer and a worker.34 The FLSA's legislative 
27. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr, supra note 5, at 12-13. 
28. Id. at 12. 
29. Id. at 12-13. 
30. Id. at 13. 
31. H.R. REP. No. 75-2738, at 28 (1937) (Conf. Rep.). 
32. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr, supra note 5, at 14-15. 
33. Id. at 295-303. 
'34. Id. at 71-77; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207 (2000). The Act defines an employee as 
"any individual employed by an employer." 29 U.S.c. § 203(e)(1) (2000). An employer 
is defined as "any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in 
relation to an employee ...." 29 U.S.c. § 203(d). The "verb 'employ' [is defined] 
expansively to mean 'suffer or permit to work.'" Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 
503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (quoting 29 U.S.c. § 203(g». In Nationwide, the Supreme 
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history demonstrates that Congress intended the term "employee" 
to have an expansive scope.35 Senator Hugo Black stated that the 
term "employee" in the FLSA was intended to be given "the 
broadest definition that has ever been included in anyone act. "36 
Another Congressman characterized the FLSA as "the most mo­
mentous and far-reaching measure that ... [Congress has] consid­
ered for many years."37 The United States Supreme Court also 
noted that the"[b]readth of coverage was vital to the [Act's] rnis­
sion"38 to eradicate substandard working conditions.39 
To determine whether a person is an employee for FLSA pur­
poses, courts look at the totality of the circumstances, and particu­
larly at the "economic reality" of the relationship.40 The Supreme 
Court explained that the economic reality test considers whether 
one took a job "in expectation of compensation."41 An individual 
who works solely for pleasure or other non-financial purpose, with­
out promise or expectation of compensation, is not protected by the 
Court also stated that the definition of the word employ "stretches the meaning of 
'employee' to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a strict applica­
tion of traditional agency principles." Id. at 326. The Supreme Court has also indicated 
that this definition is so far-reaching that it may even cover persons other than those 
Congress intended to include. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Aer, supra note 5, at 76 
n.7 (citing Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947)) (holding that the 
definition, if taken literally, could be read to include students as employees of the 
schools that they attended). In addition to the "employee" criteria, the employer must 
also be an "enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for com­
merce." 29 U.S.c. § 203(r). In Shaliehsabou, however, Hebrew Home's enterprise sta­
tus is not at issue. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299 
(4th Cir. 2004), reh'g en bane denied, 369 F.3d 797 (4th Cir. 2004). 
35. John Bruntz, The Employee/Independent Contractor Dichotomy: A Rose is 
Not Always a Rose, 8 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 337, 341-42 (1991); see also id. at 342 
n.48 (citing Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 340 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 
459 U.S. 874 (1982) (quoting Senator Hugo Black's statement that the term "employee" 
in the FLSA was intended to be given "the broadest definition that has ever been in­
cluded in anyone act")). 
36. 81 CONGo REC. 7648, 7657 (1937). 
37. 83 CONGo REC. 9246, 9262 (1938) (statement of Representative Fish). 
38. Bruntz, supra note 35, at 355 (citing 83 CONGo REC. 9262 (1938) and Powell v. 
United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 516 (1950)). 
39. Corbett, supra note 17, at 355. 
40. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Aer, supra note 5, at 73; see also Bartels v. 
Birmingham, 332 U.s. 126, 130 (1947) (holding that "employees are those who as a 
matter of economic reality are dependent upon the business to which they render 
service"). 
41. Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301-02 (1985). 
The "economic reality" test is also used to determine whether an entity can be defined 
as an enterprise under the Act. Courts must assess whether the entity has entered the 
"economic arena [and is involved in] trafficking in the marketplace." Id. at 294. 
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FLSA.42 Considering the broad scope intended by Congress, the 
Supreme Court's economic reality test appears relatively easy to 
meet. 
Despite the all-encompassing definition of the term "em­
ployee," and the broad application intended by Congress, the 
FLSA does enumerate certain exceptions to its minimum wage and 
overtime requirements.43 In light of the societal conditions that 
Congress intended to rectify by enacting the FLSA, courts construe 
the statutory exemptions from the FLSA narrowly.44 The Supreme 
Court explained that Congress specifically developed certain excep­
tions to the FLSA and that "[t]he details with which the exemptions 
in this Act have been made preclude their enlargement by implica­
tion."45 In A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling ("A.H. Phillips"),46 a case 
involving a FLSA exemption (that was later repealed) for retail es­
tablishments,47 the Supreme Court held that "[t]o extend an exemp­
tion to other than those plainly and unmistakably within its terms 
and spirit is to abuse the interpretive process and to frustrate the 
announced will of the people."48 However, confusion relating to 
congressional debate49 over a proposed 1966 amendment to the 
FLSA led the Fourth Circuit to do precisely what the Supreme 
Court warned against in A.H. Phillips. 
In 1966, Congress considered a proposed amendment to the 
42. [d. at 295 (quoting Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 u.s. 148, 152 
(1947». 
43. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr, supra note 5, at 295-303. Very particular­
ized exemptions are provided for certain white-collar workers, agricultural workers, 
seamen, and babysitters, to name a few. For a list of additional exemptions, see id. at 
295-303. Congress included these narrow exemptions partially because its regulation of 
particular activities, which were traditionally controlled by the states, would be beyond 
the scope of the Commerce Power. Id. at 30-31. Throughout the existence of the FLSA, 
Congress has created and revoked exemptions. The number of exemptions, for both 
minimum wage and overtime requirements, recognized by Congress has decreased over 
time. Consequently, the FLSA's protections have increasingly been extended to more 
employees. Id. at 160-61. See id. at 295-303 for a list of exemptions, including those 
which have been repealed. 
44. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr, supra note 5, at 162-63 (citing to Addison 
v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods. Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 618 (1944». 
45. Addison, 322 U.S. at 618. 
46. 324 U.S. 490 (1945). 
47. 29 U.S.c. § 213(a)(2) (repealed 1989). 
48. A.H. Phillips, 324 U.S. at 493. The Court reasoned, "Congress did not intend 
to exempt as a 'retail establishment' the warehouse and central office of an interstate 
chain store system." [d. at 496-97. 
49. For further consideration of this congressional debate, see infra Parts II.B.2 
and III.B. 
2006] SHALIEHSABOU V. HEBREW HOME 377 

FLSA regarding the meaning of the term "enterprise."50 During 
the debate, an exchange took place which focused on whether nuns 
employed in the cafeteria of a parochial elementary school would 
be exempt from the Act's minimum wage requirements. 51 The 
question was answered affirmatively.52 Although the final version53 
of the 1966 Amendment only focused on the definition of the term 
"enterprise," and not the term "employee," both the Department 
of Labor ("DOL") and the Fourth Circuit54 relied upon the afore­
mentioned exchange to justify a ministerial exemption to the term 
"employee" under the FLSA.55 Judge Luttig's dissent in the 
Shaliehsabou case concerning the majority's improper reliance on 
congressional exchanges has considerable merit.56 This is especially 
true in light of the Fourth Circuit's reliance on Title VII cases when 
considering FLSA wage and hour issues because Title VII treat­
ment of hiring issues is inapplicable to FLSA treatment of wage and 
hour issues. 
C. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
In an effort to desegregate employment, particularly in the 
South, Congress included Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.57 
50. 29 U.S.c. § 203(r) (2000). Issues surrounding the meaning of the term "enter­
prise" are beyond the scope of this Note. However, congressional debate on this issue, 
addressed later in this Note, does shed light on whether ministerial workers are "em­
ployees" under the FLSA. See infra Parts II.B.2 and III.B. 
51. 112 CONGo REc. 11360, 11371 (1966). 
52. Id. 
Mr. PUCINSKI. Let us consider a parochial elementary school, in which the 





Mr. COLLIER. No, they would not be covered. 

Mr. BURTON of California. As I understand, it is not the gentleman's inten­

tion to include members of a religious order under the definition of employee, 

and therefore a nun would not be considered an employee. Therefore, a mini­

mum wage would not be required to be paid a nun. Am I correct in my under­

standing of the gentleman's intention? 

Mr. COLLIER. That is correct. I did not intend to cover them. 

Id. 
53. 29 U.S.c. § 203(r). 
54. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 369 F.3d 299, 305-07 
(4th Cir. 2004); Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990). 
55. 112 CONGo REC. 11360, 11371 (1966). For further discussion see infra Parts 
II.B.2 and III.B. 
56. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 369 F.3d 797, 802 (4th 
Cir. 2004) (Luttig, J., dissenting). 
57. LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS Acr 21, 49 (Bernard Grofman ed., 
2000) (citing 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000e-2000e-17). 
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Title VII prohibits discrimination in the employment setting. 58 
Courts have found it difficult, however, to reconcile the goal of 
non-discrimination in the workplace with religious organizations' 
right to, and need for, autonomy in employing ministers and clergy 
members.59 Indeed, courts must confront the seemingly inevitable 
collision between the compelling objective of safeguarding against 
discrimination and the government neutrality mandated by the re­
ligion clauses of the First Amendment.60 Since the enactment of 
Title VII, courts have been called upon to differentiate between 
government promotion of religion through preferential treatment 
provided to religious organizations, which is impermissible, and the 
permissible effect of allowing religious organizations to advance re­
ligion without governmental interference.61 
58. Id. Under Title VII, "[e]mployers may hire and fire, promote and refuse to 
promote for any reason, good or bad, provided only that individuals may not be dis­
criminated against because of race, religion, sex or national origin." RICHARD ALLEN 
EpSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
LAWS 161 n.2 (1992) (citing Senator Humphrey's remarks at 110 CONGo REc. 6548 
(1964)). 
59. See, e.g., Combs V. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of United Methodist 
Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999) (denying female clergy member's claim that 
church-minister exception under Title VII no longer exists); E.E.O.C. V. Catholic Univ. 
of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (sex discrimination claim brought by Catholic nun 
in relation to denial of tenure at Catholic university); Minker V. Baltimore Annual Con­
ference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (age discrimination 
suit filed by minister who had his request for reassignment denied); Rayburn V. Gen. 
Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th Cir. 1985) ("Of course 
churches are not-and should not be-above the law. Like any other person or organi­
zation, they may be held liable for their torts and upon their valid contracts. Their 
employment decisions may be subject to Title VII scrutiny, where the decision does not 
involve the church's spiritual functions."). 
60. The First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law respecting an es­
tablishment of religion, or prohibiting free exercise thereof ...." U.S. CONST. amend. 1. 
"The Establishment Clause ... prevents a State from enacting laws that have the 'pur­
pose' or 'effect' of advancing or inhibiting religion." Zelman V. Simmons-Harris, 536 
U.S. 639,648-49 (citing Agostini V. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1997). It is clear that a 
religious organization's hiring decisions are protected by the Free Exercise Clause and 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The government cannot tell a relig­
ious organization whom it should or should not hire. For further discussion of whether 
a similar analysis should apply to overtime pay and a minimum wage requirements 
under the FLSA, see infra Part III.D. 
61. Laura L. Coon, Employment Discrimination By Religious Institutions: Limit­
ing the Sanctuary o/the Constitutional Ministerial Exception to Religion-Based Employ­
ment Decisions, 54 VAND. L. REv. 481, 495 (2001) (citing Corp. of the Presiding Bishop 
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints V. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336-37 
(1987». In Amos, the Court clarified, "A law is not unconstitutional simply because it 
allows churches to advance religion, which is their very purpose. For a law to have 
forbidden effects ... government [must have] advanced religion through its own activi­
ties and influence." Coon, supra note 61, at 495 n.55 (citing Corp. of the Presiding 
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Congress did not intend Title VII to apply to employees who 
performed religious functions.62 Thus, when an employee asserts a 
Title VII employment discrimination claim against a religious or­
ganization, the employer typically invokes the protection of Title 
VII's statutory religious exemption63 or the constitutional ministe­
rial exception.64 Indeed, § 702 of Title VII exempts religious corpo­
rations, associations, educational institutions, or societies from the 
Title's provisions "with respect to the employment of individuals of 
a particular religion to perform work connected with" the organiza­
tion's activities.65 Prior to a congressional amendment to § 702 in 
1972, the exemption applied only to an organization's "religious" 
activities.66 The 1972 amendment deleted the word "religious," 
thereby removing Title VII protection for workers who performed 
secular duties for religious organizations as well as those who per­
formed religious duties.67 
Following the 1972 amendment, numerous employees chal­
lenged the constitutionality of the exemption.68 Challengers al­
leged that § 702 "favored religious organizations by allowing 
religious employers to avoid application of Title VII, while similarly 
situated non-religious employers remained open to liability," 
thereby violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amend­
ment.69 Thus, courts have been hesitant to construe § 702 as vest­
ing complete immunity from discrimination claims in religious 
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337 
(1987». 
62. Coon, supra note 61, at 487. 
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2000). 
64. Coon, supra note 61, at 486. The constitutional ministerial exemption is 
rooted in both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. 
65. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-1. 
66. Civil Rights Act of 1964, PUB. L. No. 88-352, § 702, 78 Stat. 241, 255; see 
Joanne C. Brant, "Our Shield Belongs to the Lord": Religious Employers and a Consti­
tutional Right to Discriminate, 21 HASTINGS CaNST. L.Q. 275, 284 (1994). 
67. Brant, supra note 66, at 284. In McClure v. Salvation Army, the Fifth Circuit 
extended the constitutional ministerial exemption to discrimination based on sex, race 
and national origin, explaining, "The relationship between an organized church and its 
ministers is its lifeblood. The minister is the chief instrument by which the church seeks 
to fulfill its purpose. Matters touching this relationship must necessarily be recognized 
as of prime ecclesiastical concern." Coon, supra note 61, at 499-506 (referring to Mc­
Clure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972»; 
see also Janet S. Belcove-Shalin, Ministerial Exception and Title-VII Claims: Case Law 
Grid Analysis, 2 NEV. L.J. 86 (2002). 
68. Coon, supra note 61, at 488. 
69. [d. The Establishment Clause prohibits state governance that either inhibits 
or advances religion. [d. 
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organizations.70 Although the Supreme Court upheld the constitu­
tionality of Title VII's built-in exception for both secular and non­
secular activities of religious institutions,?1 subsequent federal case 
law has limited the extent to which such organizations can assert 
immunity from employment discrimination claims.72 Moreover, 
most courts have held that religious organizations may discriminate 
only if discriminatory employment decisions are "sufficiently 
rooted in religious belief or practice to implicate the First Amend­
ment's Religion Clauses."73 
II. RELEVANT CASE LAW 
A. Title VII Cases 
Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists74 is 
the first Fourth Circuit case to articulate the standard for applying 
the Title VII ministerial exception.75 Rayburn, who applied for an 
internship with the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, alleged that the 
church sexually and racially discriminated against her in violation of 
Title VII.76 Cognizant that Title VII did not protect religious em­
ployers from all forms of employment discrimination, the court de­
veloped a test that balanced the goals of Title VII with a religious 
organization's constitutional right to religious autonomy.77 The re­
sulting standard considers the employee's position, or the position 
sought, to determine "'if the employee's primary duties consist of 
teaching, spreading the faith, church governance supervision of a 
religious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual 
and worship.' "78 If the question is answered in the affirmative, 
then a ministerial exemption applies, and the organization is not 
held to Title VII mandates with respect to employment discrimina­
tion.79 To avoid excessive entanglement in church matters by sub­
70. Id. 
71. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
72. Coon, supra note 61, at 503. 
73. [d. 
74. Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th 
Cir. 1985). 
75. [d. at 1169. 
76. [d. at 1165. 
77. Coon, supra note 61, at 504. 
78. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169 (quoting Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the 
Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 
79 COLUM. L. REv. 1514, 1545 (1979)). 
79. Id. 
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jectively evaluating religious factors, the court deferred to the 
church's hiring decision.80 The court held that "introduction of gov­
ernment standards to the selection of spiritual leaders would signifi­
cantly and perniciously rearrange the relationship between church 
and state."81 The position at issue in Rayburn was that of a liaison 
between the church and "those whom it would touch with its mes­
sage."82 Because the selection process involved subjective religious 
elements, such as spirituality, the church was entitled to non-inter­
ference by the government pursuant to the First Amendment's re­
ligion clauses.83 
A later Fourth Circuit decision that applied the "primary du­
ties" standard established by Rayburn was Equal Employment Op­
portunity Commission v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh 
("EEOC").84 In EEOC, the plaintiff was employed by a Catholic 
elementary school as a music teacher.85 Her primary duties con­
sisted of planning parish liturgies, directing the choir, and teaching 
music classes to students.86 The plaintiff filed suit alleging that her 
employment was limited, and then terminated, because of her sex.87 
The court held that the well-recognized ministerial exception pro­
hibited application of Title VII in this particular employment deci­
sion because the "constitutionally compelled limitation on civil 
authority ensures that no branch of secular government trespasses 
on the most spiritually intimate grounds of a religious community's 
existence."88 The court did note, however, that the ministerial ex­
ception does not exempt religious employers from application of 
federal anti-discrimination statutes altogether.89 Rather, the ex­
emption is limited to spiritual functions. 90 After applying the pri­
80. Coon, supra note 61, at 505 (citing Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1167-68). Govern­
ment entanglement in religious matters constitutes a violation of the First Amendment. 
Id. 
81. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169. 
82. Id. at 1168. 
83. Id. 
84. 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000). 
85. Id. at 798. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 800. The court also noted that this doctrine of non-interference with 
church employment decisions is widely recognized in other circuits. 
89. Id. at 801 ("Where no spiritual function is involved, the First Amendment 
does not stay the application of a generally applicable law such as Title VII to the 
religious employer."). The Title VII exemption is limited to what is necessary to com­
ply with the First Amendment. Id.; see also Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1171. 
90. EEOC, 213 F.3d at 801. For example, the Act would not apply to a religious 
organization's hiring of custodial or administrative personnel. Id. 
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mary duties test, the court concluded that the plaintiff's primary 
duties were ministerial and, therefore, the plaintiff was not afforded 
the protection of Title VII.91 The court's decision to provide a Title 
VII ministerial exemption for an employee who spreads religious 
faith through teaching music and planning liturgies is consistent 
with the "primary duties" test set forth in Rayburn.92 
B. 	 Fair Labor Standards Act Cases 
Here, the discussion turns to several judicial interpretations of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act's applicability with respect to relig­
ious organizations. This section first addresses the principal case,93 
in which the issues set forth in this Note arose. Next, the discussion 
turns to Dole ,94 a Fourth Circuit case on which the Shaliehsabou 
court relied, and also Alamo,95 a Supreme Court decision which the 
Shaliehsabou court failed to consider. 
1. 	 Principal Case: Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater 
Washington 
In Shaliehsabou, the plaintiff worked for the defendant, a non­
profit religious and charitable corporation, as a Mashgiach. 96 As a 
Mashgiach, the plaintiff was responsible for ensuring that food 
served to residents of the Hebrew Home, which predominantly 
housed members of the Jewish faith, conformed with Jewish dietary 
laws.97 Shaliehsabou worked in this capacity from 1992 through 
August 2000.98 Upon his resignation, Shaliehsabou filed suit in Ma­
ryland state court alleging that he was entitled to overtime wages 
pursuant to the FLSA and Maryland state law because, throughout 
91. Id. at 802. The court concluded that the position was ministerial because it 
was important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church. 
92. 	 Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169. 
93. 	 Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 247 F. Supp. 2d 728 
(D. Md. 2003), affd, 363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 2004). 
94. 	 Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990). 
95. 	 Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985). 
96. Shaliehsabou, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 729 n.2. A Mashgiach is "an inspector ap­
pointed by a board of Orthodox rabbis to guard against any violation of Jewish dietary 
laws." RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1181 (2d ed. 1998). 
97. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash. Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 301 (4th 
Cir. 2004), reh'g en bane denied, 369 F.3d 797 (4th Cir. 2004); see also Shaliehsabou, 247 
F. Supp. 2d at 729 n.2 (noting that a Mashgiach is a central figure in Jewish dietary law 
who ensures that Jewish kosher laws are enforced). "[A] Mashgiach is essential, may be 
required on the premises at all times, must be present to check all products brought into 
the establishment and must also be present during the preparation of food." Id. 
98. 	 Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 300. 
2006] SHALIEHSABOU V. HEBREW HOME 383 

his employment, he was not compensated for all overtime hours 
worked.99 The case was removed to the United States District 
Court for the District of Maryland, which held that Shaliehsabou 
fell within a ministerial exemption to the FLSA and, therefore, was 
not entitled to overtime pay.lOO Shaliehsabou appealed to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which af­
firmed the lower court's decision.l°1 Subsequently, Shaliehsabou 
petitioned the Fourth Circuit to hear the case en banc.l°2 His peti­
tion was denied.103 
The United States District Court identified the primary issue as 
whether "the ministerial exemption applies," because if it did, the 
plaintiff would not be "a covered employee" under the FLSA.104 
The U.S. District Court and the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit both held that the plaintiff was employed in a 
ministerial role by a religiously affiliated employer and thus was not 
entitled to overtime pay under the FLSA.105 The primary authority 
cited by the District Court and the Fourth Circuit majority was the 
Fourth Circuit's opinion in Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church.106 
99. [d. at 303-04. 
100. Shaliehsabou, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 733. The district court also noted that even 
if Shaliehsabou did not fall within the ministerial exemption, he was an exempt execu­
tive, administrative or professional employee, under 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.1-541.3 (2003). [d. 
at 733-34. This exemption is limited to salaried employees. It is not clear whether the 
plaintiff was a salaried employee, because he was often paid at an hourly rate for addi­
tional hours when he worked more than eighty hours bi-weekly. Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d 
at 303-04 n.5. This Note will not address the issue whether Plaintiff falls under 29 
C.F.R. §§ 541.1-541.3 (2003). 
101. Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 311. A three judge panel for the Fourth Circuit 
heard this case and reached a 2-1 decision. Judge Luttig, the dissenting judge, recom­
mended that the plaintiff petition the entire Fourth Circuit to hear the case. Moreover, 
Judge Luttig noted that even if a ministerial exemption existed, it would not be as far­
reaching as the majority held. [d. 
102. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 369 F.3d 797, 797-98 
(4th Cir. 2004). 
103. [d. However, there was a significant split between the judges. Though nine 
judges voted against rehearing the case, four judges joined Judge Luttig in his dissenting 
opinion, which was significantly longer than his prior dissenting opinion. [d. 
104. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 247 F. Supp. 2d 728, 
730 (D. Md. 2003), affd, 363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 2004). Note that the issue identified by 
the District Court is not whether there is a recognized exemption to the FLSA. The 
court seems to assume that one exists. The second issue before the court is whether, if 
the exemption is inapplicable, Plaintiff was an exempt managerial, professional, or ad­
ministrative employee. [d. As previously mentioned, this Note will not address the 
second issue. 
105. [d. at 733; Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 310-11. 
106. Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990). For fur­
ther discussion of Dole, see infra Part II.B.2. For a discussion of the Shaliehsabou 
court's reliance on Dole, see infra Part III.H. 
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Basing its decision on congressional debate and Labor Department 
guidelines, the Fourth Circuit in Dole recognized an exemption 
from the FLSA similar in scope to the ministerial exemption from 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.107 
In his brief, yet striking, dissent, Judge Luttig wholly rejected 
the majority opinion, arguing that no such exemption from the 
FLSA existed. lOB Judge Luttig, dissenting in two sentences, stated, 
I do not believe that there is a 'ministerial exemption' to the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, ... and if there were, I do not believe that 
it would be as far-reaching as the court holds today. Because of 
the obvious importance of the issue decided, and the evident in­
correctness of the court's holding, I urge the appellant to seek 
rehearing en bane from this court, and failing rehearing en bane 
by this court, to seek review in the Supreme Court of the United 
States.109 
As previously noted, upon Shaliehsabou's petition, a majority 
of the Fourth Circuit declined to hear the case.11° This prompted 
an in-depth dissenting opinion from Judge Luttig.111 Pointing to the 
majority's reliance on congressional debate,112 Judge Luttig noted 
that no other court had ever excluded an employee from FLSA 
coverage based on a ministerial exemption.113 
2. Additional FLSA Cases 
In carving out its ministerial exemption to the FLSA, the 
Shaliehsabou majority relied on the Fourth Circuit's opinion in 
Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church. 114 The Dole decision high­
107. Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 305; Dole, 899 F.2d at 1397. 
108. Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 311 (Luttig, J., dissenting). 
109. Id. Perhaps Judge Luttig chose to write such a brief dissenting opinion be­
cause he felt confident in his conclusion and believed that upon revisiting this case other 
judges would draw the same conclusion. 
110. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 369 F.3d 797, 797 (4th 
Cir. 2004). Within the Fourth Circuit, four judges voted to rehear the case, and nine 
voted against revisiting it. Id. 
111. Id. at 798-806 (Luttig, J., dissenting). 
112. Id. Judge Luttig referred to the lack of a textual basis for a ministerial ex­
emption, the majority's unfounded reliance on congressional debate, and its improper 
reliance on DOL guidelines. For a more detailed discussion of Judge Luttig's analysis, 
see infra Part III. 
113. Id. at 798. Though in Dole the Fourth Circuit did acknowledge such an ex­
emption in dicta, it did not apply the exemption because the plaintiff did not meet the 
"primary duties" test. See infra Part III.B; Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 
F.2d 1389, 1396 (4th Cir. 1990). 
114. See Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 305 (citing Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist 
Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1391-92 (4th Cir. 1990». 
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lights the judicial confusion surrounding the existence of a ministe­
rial exemption to the FLSA. Dole involved a salary dispute 
between the Shenandoah Baptist Church and the teachers and staff 
who worked at the church's Christian school, Roanoke Valley.115 
The government brought suit alleging that Shenandoah violated 
two elements of the FLSA by paying support staff less than mini­
mum wage and by paying female teachers less than male teach­
ers.116 Shenandoah argued that Congress did not intend schools 
such as Roanoke Valley to be covered as "enterprises" under the 
FLSA, and that Congress did not intend the Act to cover teachers 
and staff at church-run schools as "employees."117 
To determine whether Congress intended to include schools 
such as Roanoke Valley within the term "enterprise,"118 the court 
looked to congressional debate surrounding the aforementioned 
1966 amendment to the FLSA.n9 Though Shenandoah argued that 
the amendment was ambiguous, the court concluded that Congress 
clearly intended to include a school such as Roanoke Valley within 
the ACt.120 
After deciding the "enterprise" question, the court turned to 
whether Congress intended those employed as teachers and staff to 
be covered as "employees" under the FLSA.l2l Based on the pri­
mary duties test applied in Rayburn, the court held that the plain­
tiffs did not fall within a ministerial exemption from the FLSA.122 
Significantly, the Fourth Circuit relied on Rayburn, a Title VII case, 
in determining whether Dole was a protected employee under the 
115. Dole, 899 F.2d at 1391-92. 
116. [d. at 1392. 
117. [d. at 1393-94. 
118. As previously noted, the question whether Roanake Valley fell within the 
term "enterprise" is beyond the scope of this Note. However, congressional debate on 
this issue, addressed elsewhere in this Note, does shed some light on whether ministe­
rial workers are "employees" under the FLSA. See Parts I.B and IILB for further 
discussion of this congressional debate. 
119. Id. at 1394; see supra Part LB. 
120. Id. at 1395. The court notes that plain language indicates Congress's inten­
tion to include public and private schools, regardless of whether the particular school is 
operated for profit. Id. at 1394 (citing 29 U.S.c. § 203(r) (2000». 
121. Id. at 1396. 
122. Id. at 1396-97. The Rayburn court held that a ministerial exemption from 
Title VII depended on the "spiritual and pastoral" function of the position and not the 
characterization of the position as clergy. Note that this case was talking about an ex­
emption from Title VII and not an exemption from the FLSA. Rayburn v. General 
Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168-69 (4th Cir. 1985). The 
Dole court does not clearly justify its decision to extend the Title VII "employee" crite­
ria to the proposed FLSA "employee" exemption. 
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FLSA.123 The Dole court did not justify this extension of the "pri­
mary duties" test, nor did it consider the contrast between a Title 
VII claim for discrimination in hiring decisions and a FLSA claim 
involving wage and hour concerns. 
In addition to congressional debate, the Dole court looked to 
guidelines issued by the Labor Department's Wage and Hour Ad­
ministrator to carve out this ministerial exemption to the FLSA.124 
DOL guidelines state, in pertinent part, that "[p]ersons such as 
nuns, monks, priests, lay brothers, ministers, deacons and other 
members of religious orders who serve pursuant to their religious 
obligations in the schools ... operated by their church or religious 
order shall not be considered to be 'employees.' "125 The United 
States Supreme Court, however, has announced that the weight 
given to an administrator's decision depends on the thoroughness 
of consideration, validity of reasoning, and consistency with earlier 
pronouncements.126 The Dole decision does not indicate that the 
court considered these factors before relying on the DOL 
guidelines. 
In Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor 
("Alamo")127 the Supreme Court sets forth principles that are ap­
plicable to the FLSA question Shaliehsabou presents. In Alamo, 
the primary issue was whether the FLSA's minimum wage, over­
time, and record-keeping requirements applied to workers engaged 
in the commercial activities of a religious organization, and whether 
such an application would violate the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment.128 The employees in Alamo provided services at 
a number of the Foundation's commercial businesses, which raised 
money for a variety of Christian programs.129 The Foundation ar­
gued that the FLSA was inapplicable because its workers did not 
receive monetary wages and, therefore, were not "employees."130 
123. Dole, 899 F.2d at 1396-97. 
124. Id. at 1396. 
125. Id. at 1396 (quoting Wage and Hour Division, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Field 
Operations Handbook § 10b03(b) (1967». 
126. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). See infra Part III.B for a 
further explanation of this concept. 
127. Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985). 
128. Id. at 291-92. 
129. Id. at 292. The Foundation's Articles of Incorporation provided that its pri­
mary purposes were to "establish, conduct and maintain an Evangelistic Church; to 
conduct religious services, to minister to the sick and needy, to care for the fatherless 
and to rescue the fallen, and generally to do those things needful for the promotion of 
Christian faith, virtue, and charity." Id. 
130. Id. at 292, 300. Though the workers did not receive cash salaries, they were 
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Moreover, the workers themselves protested the Act's coverage.131 
The Court held, however, that the "purposes of the Act require that 
it be applied even to those who would decline its protections. "132 
The Court went on to explain that if it recognized an exception for 
employees who claimed that they performed services "voluntarily," 
employers could potentially assert superior bargaining power to co­
erce workers to waive FLSA protection by claiming that they 
worked voluntarily.133 Further, the Court classified the workers' 
duties as more than" 'a religious liturgy engaged in bringing good 
news to a pagan world'" because the Foundation had entered the 
"economic arena."134 Therefore, the Court held that the Founda­
tion's commercial activities fell within the reach of the FLSA.135 
Thus, after Alamo, the FLSA's provisions could be applied to relig­
ious organizations that engaged in commercial activities undertaken 
with a business purpose, even though workers were actively in­
volved in spreading the Christian faith.136 In light of the shortcom­
ings of the Shaliehsabou majority's decision, it is appropriate to 
question the Shaliehsabou court's failure to consider the Supreme 
Court's extension of FLSA protection to a religious organization in 
Alamo. 
III. ANALYSIS 
This Note argues that the Fourth Circuit's decisions in Dole 
and Shaliehsabou, which carved out a ministerial exception to the 
FLSA, were in error. Moreover, the exemption that the Shalieh­
sabou court ultimately recognized went far beyond any scope that a 
ministerial exemption to the FLSA could reasonably encompass. 
Drawing from the dissenting opinion in the principal case, the main 
points of this argument are discussed below. 
dependent on the Foundation for food, clothing, shelter and other benefits. The Court 
found this compensation adequate to classify the workers as employees. Id. at 292, 301. 
131. [d. at 302. 
132. [d. 
133. [d. 
134. [d. at 294-295 (quoting Donovan v. Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation, 722 
F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1983». The Court applied the "economic reality" test to deter­
mine whether the Foundation is an enterprise under the Act. [d. at 294. 
135. [d. at 306. 
136. The Court held that application of the Act would not impact the Founda­
tion's evangelical activities because the Act's provisions impose very minimal govern­
ment entanglement with religion. The Court noted that the "Establishment Clause 
does not exempt religious organizations from ... secular governmental activity," and 
that the record-keeping provisions of the FLSA are not significantly intrusive into relig­
ious affairs. [d. at 305-06. 
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A. 	 Ministerial Exemption is Without a Textual or Precedential 
Basis 
Neither Supreme Court precedent interpreting the FLSA nor 
the text of the Act itself supports a ministerial exemption from the 
FLSA. The ministerial exemption proposed in Shaliehsabou is un­
detectable in the text of the FLSA, though the Act enumerates doz­
ens of exemptions.137 If Congress intended to include a ministerial 
exemption, it was capable of doing so explicitly.138 With respect to 
statutory interpretation, Justice Scalia has suggested that judges 
should avoid efforts to glean legislative intent.139 He asserts that 
when courts attempt to determine what legislators mean, judges 
often end up pursuing their own objectives and desires.14o Rather 
than looking to legislative intent, courts should focus on the plain 
text of a statute, and the plain text of the FLSA clearly lacks a min­
isterial exemption.141 
The text of the FLSA sets forth a detailed explanation of the 
intended broad meaning of the term "employee."142 The FLSA 
purposely defines "employee" in very general terms as "any indi­
vidual employed by an employer."143 Also, the Supreme Court has 
clearly stated that the test for employment under the FLSA is "one 
of economic reality," turning on whether the person undertook the 
job "in expectation of compensation."144 Clearly, Shaliehsabou ex­
pected compensation for his duties, evidenced by the fact that he 
137. 	 See THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Aer, supra note 5, at 295-303. 
138. When Congress creates exceptions within a statute, it is presumed that Con­
gress considered the issue of exceptions and included the ones that it intended to in­
clude and left out the ones that it intended to leave out. See, e.g., TRW, Inc. v. 
Andrews, 534 U.S. 19,28 (2001); United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 58 (2000); An­
drus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608,616-17 (1980). 
139. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the 
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATrER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3,16-18 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
140. 	 Id. at 17-18. 
141. 	 Id. at 17. 
142. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 369 F.3d 797, 799 
(2004) (Luttig, J., dissenting). 
143. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.c. § 203(e) (2000)); see also Tony and Susan Alamo 
Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 295 (1985) (explaining that the FLSA defines 
"employee" in "exceedingly broad terms"). 
144. Alamo,471 U.S. at 301-02 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has fur­
ther expanded the "economic reality" test in at least one instance. In Mitchell v. Pil
grim Holiness Church Corp., the court held that employees of a religious corporation 
were entitled to FLSA protection, even after several employees filed affidavits indicat­
ing that they did not consider themselves "'mere wage earners,' but rather that they 
had accepted work with the defendant in belief that they were doing religious work." 
Mitchell, 210 F.2d 879, 881 (1954) (citation omitted). 
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filed suit to recover wages.145 Consequently, it seems logical that he 
would be entitled to the protections of the Act. Further, the Su­
preme Court has instructed that the FLSA be applied "liberally ... 
to the furthest reaches consistent with congressional direction."146 
The Court has repeatedly cautioned lower courts not to overstep 
their bounds in applying FLSA exceptions.147 Based on the preced­
ing findings, the majority's decision was in direct conflict with Su­
preme Court precedent. 
To be sure, it is arguable that a lengthy list of exemptions from 
the FLSA implies that Congress did not intend the FLSA's reach to 
be expansive.148 Yet this contention is weak because the FLSA's 
legislative history indicates that Congress intended very broad cov­
erage.149 Based on the Act's unambiguous text and its legislative 
history, the Supreme Court has announced that Congress intended 
the Act's coverage to be expansive, indicating that the list of ex­
emptions was intended to be exhaustive, rather than illustrative.150 
This line of reasoning bolsters the dissenting argument in Shalieh
sabou that the majority erred in reading into the FLSA a ministe­
rial exemption that lacks support in the Act's text. 
B. 	 The Fourth Circuit's Reliance on Dole in Deciding 
Shaliehsabou 
The Fourth Circuit based its conclusion in Shaliehsabou on its 
earlier decision in Dole. 151 Yet a consideration of the basis and the 
shortcomings of Dole indicates that this reliance was in error.152 
145. See Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 247 F. Supp. 2d 
728 (D. Md. 2003), affd, 363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 2004). 
146. Alamo, 471 U.S. at 296 (quoting Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Assoc., 
353 U.S. 207, 211 (1959)). 
147. [d.; see also A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945) (declaring 
that exemption from FLSA coverage should extend only to those "plainly and unmis­
takably within its terms and spirit"). 
148. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 649 (1990) 
(holding list of exemptions to be illustrative where neither the text nor the legislative 
history indicates that the list was intended to be exhaustive). But see City of Chicago v. 
Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 337-38 (1994); Keene Corp. v. United 
States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993) (holding that listed exemptions demonstrate that Con­
gress knew how to draft exemptions, and would have done so if a particular exemption 
were intended). The fact that Congress has created and revoked exemptions over time 
also indicates that Congress is prepared and willing to change the Act's provisions when 
necessary. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr, supra note 5, at 160-61. 
149. 	 Alamo, 471 U.S. at 296. 
150. 	 [d. 
151. 	 Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990). 
152. 	 This Note is not intended to imply that Dole was decided incorrectly, be­
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First, it seems inappropriate that in recognizing a ministerial ex­
emption from the FLSA, the Dole court turned to congressional 
debate surrounding the "enterprise" amendment of 1966.153 The 
original version of the amendment would have included schools of 
higher learning, but not elementary or secondary schools.154 Con­
gressman Collier proposed that the amendment also include public 
and private elementary and secondary schools.155 Although Con­
gressman Collier expressed that he "did not intend to cover [nuns 
as employees]," an amendment to the term "employee" was never 
drafted.156 The amendment's final version did not address a minis­
terial exception to the term "employee" under the FLSA.157 The 
final amendment stated solely that elementary and secondary 
schools, whether operated for profit or not for profit, should be 
considered "enterprises" for FLSA purposes.158 
The Dole majority's reliance on the 1966 congressional ex­
change between Congressmen Collier and Burton was misplaced.159 
The majority in Shaliehsabou and the Dole court assert that this 
debate provides a basis and a justification for a ministerial exemp­
tion from the FLSA.l60 However, "the debate in which the relevant 
exchange occurred did not concern the term it is offered to modify[, 
employee,] and Congress modified the definition of the term at is­
sue[, enterprise,] immediately following the debate ... but not in 
the way suggested by the exchange."161 Had Congress enacted an 
amendment to the term "employee" after the debate, its intent to 
cause the court in Shaliehsabou is relying strictly on dicta in Dole. In dicta, the Dole 
court announced that there was a ministerial exemption from the FLSA. Id. at 1396. 
However, such an exemption would not affect the outcome of Dole because the em­
ployees at the church-operated schools did not meet the primary duties test, which the 
court applied. Id. at 1397. 
153. Id. at 1394. For further explanation of the 1966 amendment and its accom­
panying congressional debate, see supra Parts I.B and II.B.2. 
154. Dole, 899 F.2d at 1394. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. See 29 U.S.c. § 203(r)-(s) (2000). 
158. Dole, 899 F.2d at 1394; see also 29 U.S.c. § 203(r). The final version of the 
amendment changed the criteria for the "enterprise" aspect of the FLSA, but not for 
the "employee" aspect. 
159. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 369 F.3d 797, 800-01 
(4th Cir. 2004) (Luttig, J., dissenting) (citing 112 CONGo REC. 11360, 11371 (1966)). 
160. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 306 (4th 
Cir. 2004), reh'g en bane denied, 369 F.3d 797 (4th Cir. 2004); Dole, 899 F.2d at 1396. 
161. Shaliehsabou, 369 F.3d at 801 (Luttig, J., dissenting) (citing to the final ver­
sion of the amendment, which appears in 29 U.S.c. § 203(e)(3), and Fair Labor Stan­
dards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. 89-601, 80 Stat. 830). Because Congress did not 
amend the term "employee" there is no way to discern whether other members of Con­
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preclude ministerial employers from enjoying protection under the 
FLSA would be clear, but it did not.162 Therefore, and in accor­
dance with Judge Luttig's argument, the 1966 congressional ex­
change is not a meaningful foundation for the exemption.163 
Although the congressional exchange demonstrates that one or 
two members of the House believed that "members of a religious 
order" were not "employees" within the FLSA,it fails as a demon­
stration of congressional intent.164 The Fourth Circuit and the Su­
preme Court have recognized that "[t]he remarks of individual 
legislators, even sponsors of legislation, ... are not regarded as a 
reliable measure of congressional intent."165 This maxim is particu­
larly relevant when the meaning of the statutory text is clear.166 In 
certain situations, congressional exchanges can aid in attributing 
meaning to ambiguous pieces of legislation. However, as noted 
previously, the plain language of the FLSA is devoid of an intention 
to provide an exemption for ministerial employees, and therefore 
the remarks relied on by the Dole court are not a reliable measure 
of congressional intent. Despite the contrary context and lack of 
authority of the 1966 congressional exchange, both the Fourth Cir­
cuit and the DOL relied on it to carve out a ministerial exception to 
the FLSA. 
The Dole court concluded that a ministerial exemption from 
the FLSA was appropriate, relying on the congressional exchange, 
but held that the plaintiffs did not fall within this narrow exception, 
based on the "primary duties" test announced in Rayburn.167 The 
"primary duties" test established for Title VII claims, however, is 
gress supported Congressman Collier's interpretation of the term "employee." Id. at 
801 n.2. 
162. Note that congressional intent is arguably very clear because Congress dis­
cussed the term employee and had the opportunity to amend and clarify the statute. 
However, it chose not to. 
163. Shaliehsabou, 369 F.3d at 800-02. 
164. Id. at 800. 
165. Id. at 801 (citing w. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1991); 
Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35 (1982); Roy v. County of Lexington, 141 F.3d 533, 
539 (4th Cir. 1998)) (alteration in original). 
166. Id. at 801 (citing Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Director, 506 U.S. 153, 166 
(1993); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 237 (1984); Pa. RR Co. v. Int'! Coal Mining Co., 
230 U.S. 184, 199 (1913)). 
167. Dole, 899 F.2d at 1396-97. The Rayburn court held that a ministerial exemp­
tion from Title VII depended on the "spiritual and pastoral" function of the position 
and not the characterization of the position as clergy. Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of 
Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168-69 (4th Cir. 1985). Note that this case was 
discussing an exemption from Title VII and not an exemption from the FLSA. 
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not pertinent to claims of employees under the FLSA.168 Moreo­
ver, the Dole court did not clearly justify its decision to extend the 
Title VII "employee" criteria to the proposed FLSA "employee" 
exemption.169 Judge Luttig points out in his dissenting opinion, 
"The fact that an individual is a 'ministerial' employee or that his 
primary duties are religious in nature has no bearing on [the] deter­
mination [of whether that person is to be considered an employee 
under the FLSA]."170 
The 1966 congressional dialogue misled not only the Dole 
court, but also the DOL.I71 In fact, in recognizing a ministerial ex­
emption from the FLSA, the Dole court relied considerably on 
DOL guidelines, which sought to decipher the 1966 legislative dis­
cussion. l72 In spite of the inherent flaws in the aforementioned 
congressional exchange, the Wage and Hour Division of the DOL 
relied on this dialogue to add a provision to its Field Operations 
Handbook ("FOH")P3 The provision states that "[p]ersons such 
as nuns, monks, priests, lay brothers, ministers, deacons, and other 
members of religious orders who serve pursuant to their religious 
obligations in the schools, hospitals, and other institutions operated 
by their church or religious order shall not be considered to be 'em­
ployees."'174 Though the DOL decided to list this provision in its 
handbook, the FOH by no means compels a court to apply its con­
tentsp5 Generally, when an administrative agency is empowered 
168. See Shaliehsabou, 369 F.3d at 800 (Luttig, J., dissenting). 
169. Further, when the Shaliehsabou court extended the Title VII employee crite­
ria to its proposed FLSA ministerial exemption, its sole justification was that this partic­
ular court had drawn the same analogy in past cases. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of 
Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 306-07 (4th Cir. 2004), reh'g en bane denied, 369 F.3d 
797 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Dole and EEOC). The Shaliehsabou majority did say that 
courts are familiar and comfortable with this test. Id. at 307. But is that really a valid 
reason for choosing to apply a particular test? 
170. Id. at 799. Here Judge Luttig is referring to the primary duties test utilized 
in Rayburn, a Title VII case. See supra Part II.A. 
171. Congress gave the U.S. DOL the power to enforce and interpret the FLSA. 
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr supra note 5, at 40. 
172. Dole, 899 F.2d at 1396. 
173. The Field Operations Handbook is a guide for Wage and Hour investigators, 
and is also available to the public. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr, supra note 5, at 
40-41. 
174. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 369 F.3d 797, 801 (4th 
Cir. 2004) (citing WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, infra note 178, at 
§ lOb03). 
175. See THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr, supra note 5, at 164-66; see, e.g., 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (holding that administrative rulings, 
interpretations, and opinions may provide guidance but are not controlling); Overnight 
Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 580 n.17 (1942) (interpretive bulletins from 
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to craft legislation, resulting regulations are given the force of 
lawP6 However, where the agency is only given the power to inter­
pret regulations, the findings are not binding.177 In its foreword, 
the FOH states that it is "not used as a device for establishing inter­
pretive policy."178 Indeed, in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. ,179 the Su­
preme Court listed factors to consider when assessing the degree of 
deference to be afforded to an interpretive regulation issued by an 
administrative body assigned the task of interpreting a law.180 The 
Court offered the following: 
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the 
Administrator under the Act, while not controlling upon the 
courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of expe­
rience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may 
properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a 
particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with 
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which 
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.181 
In adopting a religious exception to the FLSA based solely on 
a congressional exchange between a few members of Congress, the 
DOL failed to thoroughly consider the issue before it. Conse­
quently, the DOL guideline should be afforded limited defer­
ence.182 The DOL provides no reasoning or rationale in the FOH 
for the exclusion of ministerial employees, and therefore, this regu­
lation has "no persuasive power beyond the exchange on the House 
administrative agencies do carry persuasiveness but are not binding authority); Sher­
wood v. Washington Post, 871 F.Supp. 1471, 1481 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding that interpre­
tations of administrative agencies are not legislative regulations and do not have force 
of law); Dalheim v. KDFW-TV, 918 F.2d 1220, 1228 (5th Cir. 1990) (administrative 
interpretations are not binding as law and are merely "a body of experience and in­
formed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance" (quot­
ing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140)). 
176. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr, supra note 5, at 164-66. 
177. Id. 
178. WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, FIELD OPERATIONS 
HANDBOOK 1 (1993). The guidelines in the FOH are not intended to be official rules 
and regulations, but are merely intended to provide guidance for employees. The 
DOL's official regulations, which it is empowered to enact into law, provide no similar 
exemption for "ministerial employees." Shaliehsabou, 369 F.3d at 802 n.5. 
179. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
180. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr, supra note 5, at 165-66 (citing Skid­
more, 323 U.S. at 140). 
18l. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
182. Shaliehsabou, 369 F.3d at 800-02 (Luttig, J., dissenting). 
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floor on which it was based."183 The Fourth Circuit erred in defer­
ring to the DOL guidelines without considering either the reason­
ing behind such guidelines or the appropriate weight to be afforded 
to them. In turn, both the Dole and Shaliehsabou opinions relied 
on refutable DOL guidelines to carve out a ministerial exception to 
the FLSA. 
To further complicate the court's already problematic reliance 
on DOL guidelines, the Shaliehsabou court applied the FLSA min­
isterial exception based on its decision in Dole, and held that 
Shaliehsabou was not entitled to overtime pay in light of his pri­
mary duties as a Mashgiach.184 The Shaliehsabou decision is a 
product of the majority's reliance on Dole, which improperly relied 
on DOL guidelines. As demonstrated previously, the DOL guide­
lines were a product of improper reliance on congressional debate. 
The Shaliehsabou decision is the most recent link in a chain of 
faulty reasoning. 
C. Scope of the Ministerial Exemption 
The Dole and Shaliehsabou majorities not only accepted a 
ministerial exemption from the FLSA but also expanded it far be­
yond any reasonably intended reach.185 As Judge Luttig concedes, 
even though the exemption adopted by the DOL lacks credibility, it 
is at least a narrow exception, as required by the Supreme Court.186 
Though in 1966 Congressman Collier broadly stated "that 'mem­
bers of a religious order' were not 'employees' within the meaning 
of the [FLSA]," the FOR adopted a more narrow construction of 
the rule.187 The FOR "provided that, '[1] members of religious or­
ders who [2] serve pursuant to their religious obligations [3] in the 
schools, hospitals, and other institutions operated by their church or 
religious order shall not be considered to be 'employees.' "188 De­
183. Id. at 802; see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining that legislative history must reach a high level of 
certainty to support an agency interpretation that departs from a facially clear statute). 
184. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 311 (4th 
Cir. 2004), reh'g en bane denied, 369 F.3d 797 (4th Cir. 2004). 
185. Id. at 798, 802 (Luttig, J., dissenting). 
186. Id. at 802. Exemptions from the FLSA are to be narrowly construed be­
cause Congress put considerable time and effort into carefully considering and enumer­
ating exemptions. See generally THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Aer, supra note 5, at 
163-64. See also A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945); Addison v. 
Holly Hill Fruit Products, 322 U.S. 607, 618 (1944). 
187. Shaliehsabou, 369 F.3d at 800, 802 (Luttig, J., dissenting). 
188. Id. at 802-03 (citing WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, supra note 178, at 
§ 10b03). 
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spite the Supreme Court's mandate necessitating narrow exemp­
tions to the FLSA,189 the majority in Shaliehsabou went beyond the 
standards set forth by both Congressman Collier and the DOL 
guidelines and "adopt[ ed] wholesale the contours of the constitu­
tionally-required exception of 'ministerial' employees from the cov­
erage of Title VII and other civil rights laws."190 
The excessively broad test that Shaliehsabou adopted for de­
termining whether a person is exempt under the proposed ministe­
rial exemption to the FLSA is as follows: An employee is exempt 
from the FLSA's coverage "so long as (1) [the] employee's 'primary 
duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, 
supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in 
religious ritual and worship,' and (2) that employee is employed by 
a 'religiously-affiliated' institution 'marked by clear or obvious re­
ligious characteristics.' "191 Applying this standard in Title VII 
cases, courts have excluded secular workers in religious institutions 
from Title VII protection.192 However, none of these employees 
would have been excluded had the applicable test been similar to 
that described in the FOH, which focuses on an employee's "relig­
ious obligations," and not his or her "primary duties."193 More im­
portantly, Shaliehsabou, an employee responsible for supervising 
food preparation in compliance with Jewish dietary laws in a nurs­
ing home, may not have met the DOL's more rigid standard for an 
exemption.194 Had the court applied the DOL standard set forth in 
the FOH, rather than the Title VII standard, Shaliehsabou may 
have been afforded FLSA coverage. Thus, the broad scope of the 
constitutionally-compelled Title VII exemption "cannot be recon­
ciled with" the narrow exemption alluded to in the 1966 congres­
189. See generally THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr, supra note 5, at 163-64. 
See also A.H. Phillips, 324 U.S. at 493; Addison, 322 U.S. at 618. 
190. Shaliehsabou, 369 F.3d at 802 (Luttig, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
191. [d. at 803 (citations omitted). 
192. See, e.g., Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698, 704 
(7th Cir. 2003) (applying exemption to church press secretaries); EEOC v. Southwest­
ern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 283 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying exemp­
tion to faculty at seminaries). However, Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary 
of Labor makes clear that the government is free to involve itself in secular activities of 
religious organizations for FLSA purposes. 471 U.S. 290, 305-06 (1985). 
193. Shaliehsabou, 369 F.3d at 803 (Luttig, J., dissenting). 
194. [d. Judge Luttig explained that Shaliehsabou would not meet the DOL stan­
dard of (1) "'a member of a religious order'" who was (2) '''serv[ing] pursuant to [a] 
religious obligation.'" [d. (citing WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, supra note 178, at 
§ lOb03). 
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sional hearing and described in the FOH.195 
The Shaliehsabou majority failed to justify its extension of the 
Title VII standard to FLSA disputes. Judge Luttig points out, 
[T]he majority not only accepts [an exemption for ministers] 
from the FLSA without so much as questioning the soundness of 
its foundation, but expands the contours of the exemption far be­
yond that which even the exemption's shaky foundation can sup­
port. In so doing, the majority rejects the only conceivable basis 
for a ministerial exemption in sources related to the Act itself, 
and, instead, adopts [the requirements] of the constitutionally-re­
quired [Title VII exemption].196 
The majority adopted the Title VII standard for exceptions to 
the FLSA as a "'common sense approach'" because the two are 
"'coterminous in scope. "'197 However, there exists a discrepancy 
between the origin of a Title VII exemption, which is rooted in con­
stitutional principles, and the proposed FLSA exemption, which is 
based on congressional debate and the DOL guidelines.198 An ex­
emption from Title VII for a religious organization's decisions in 
hiring ministerial employees is necessitated by the First Amend­
ment's Religion Clauses. If Congress interfered with hiring deci­
sions with respect to employees who perform religious functions, it 
would be interfering with the free exercise of religion.199 However, 
constitutional problems do not arise when the FLSA is applied to 
religious organizations. Compelling religious organizations to com­
ply with fair labor standards by paying a minimum wage and over­
time pay affects the organization's economic position, not its 
religious goals. In fact, imposing fair labor standards in no way in­
terferes with hiring decisions. 
Another flawed reason that the majority offered in favor of the 
195. Id. at 804; see EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 
801 (4th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he ministerial exception to Title VII is robust where it 
applies."). 
196. Shaliehsabou, 369 F.3d at 802 (Luttig, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
Judge Luttig seems to be saying that the majority has no justification for carving out an 
exemption to the FLSA, especially because the majority is inventing an exception 
nearly identical in scope to the "constitutionally-required" exemption under Title VII. 
197. Id. at 803 (referring to majority's statement in Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew 
Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 306 (4th Cir. 2004) ("coextensive in scope" 
and "common sense approach"». 
198. Id. at 803-04. A Title VII exemption is based on the necessity for autonomy 
in religious organizations' hiring decisions. However, compelling a religious organiza­
tion to pay a minimum wage or overtime pay does not hinder religious autonomy in the 
same way that state interference with hiring decisions would. 
199. See infra Part III.D for further explanation of these constitutional principles. 
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Title VII "primary duties" test was that the court had already im­
plied the applicability of the primary duties test in Dole .200 The 
previous section demonstrates, however, that the reasoning applied 
by the Dole court in announcing a ministerial exemption to the 
FLSA was faulty. Moreover, in Dole, the Title VII cases referred 
to by the employer were merely distinguished and found irrelevant 
by the court.201 
As support for its holding, the majority also relied upon the 
listing of Dole in a string citation in the EEOC202 case as support 
for the proposition that '''[t]he ministerial exception operates to ex­
empt from the coverage of various employment laws the employ­
ment relationships between religious institutions and their 
'ministers."'203 It is, however, irrelevant that Dole was listed in a 
string citation in EEOC to support this proposition.204 EEOC was 
a Title VII case in which FLSA issues were not before the court.205 
The court cannot reasonably lend meaning to the Dole case based 
on dicta from a Title VII case, without stretching the meaning of 
the Title VII case beyond recognition.206 
D. No Collision between the FLSA and the First Amendment 
1. Establishment Clause 
An additional blemish on the Shaliehsabou majority's ruling is 
that it found the FLSA exemption to be commensurate with the 
Title VII exemption "in order to 'avoid answering a difficult consti­
tutional question [such as] whether the First Amendment would 
otherwise compel an exception to the FLSA coextensive with that 
recognized as constitutionally mandated in the Title VII con­
text."207 As a general matter, it seems unreasonable for judges to 
issue particular rulings merely to avoid answering difficult ques­
tions. Furthermore, Judge Luttig posited that in Shaliehsabou con­
200. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 306 (4th 
Cir. 2004), reh'g en bane denied, 369 F.3d 797 (4th Cir. 2004). 
201. [d. See generally Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 
1990). 
202. EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 800 (4th Cir. 
2000). 
203. Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 306 (quoting EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of 
Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 800 (4th Cir. 2000». 
204. Shaliehsabou, 369 F.3d at 804 (Luttig, I., dissenting) 
205. [d. 
206. [d. 
207. Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 306. See supra Part I.C for a discussion of policy 
reasons behind Title VII ministerial exemptions. 
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stitutional concerns were not at issue.208 Requiring Hebrew Home 
to pay Shaliehsabou for overtime hours "does not require the gov­
ernment-or the court-to question the Hebrew Home's religious 
beliefs, inquire into the religious nature of the activities that 
Shaliehsabou performs, or to become involved in any way in the 
governance or functioning of the institution. "209 
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Alamo held that the minimum 
wage, overtime, and record-keeping provisions of the FLSA could 
be applied to religious organizations engaged in "'commercial ac­
tivities undertaken with a business purpose.' "210 The Court noted 
that 
[allowing the Foundation to pay employees] substandard wages 
would undoubtedly give petitioners and similar organizations an 
advantage over their competitors. It is exactly this kind of "un­
fair method of competition" that the [FLSA] was intended to 
prevent ... and the admixture of religious motivation does not 
alter a business's effect on commerce.211 
Moreover, by providing this economic advantage to religious 
organizations, the government arguably would be favoring religion 
over secularism, thereby violating the Establishment Clause.212 The 
Court further explained that this level of government intervention 
would not pose a risk of improper government interference with 
208. Shaliehsabou, 369 F.3d at 805 (Luttig, J., dissenting) (noting, as evidence of 
this proposition, that Hebrew Home did not even suggest constitutional concerns in its 
briefs). 
209. Id. (citing Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 u.s. 378, 
395-97 (1990». Jimmy Swaggart Ministries held that the government violates the First 
Amendment when it interferes with the church's right to religious autonomy. 493 u.s. 
at 395-97. 
210. Shaliehsabou, 369 F.3d at 805 (Luttig, J., dissenting) (quoting Tony and Su­
san Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290,305 (1985». In Alamo, the Act was 
held applicable to a non-profit religious organization. The organization's primary pur­
poses were to "establish, conduct and maintain an Evangelistic Church; to conduct re­
ligious services, to minister to the sick and needy, to care for the fatherless and to 
rescue the fallen, and generally to do those things needful for the promotion of Chris­
tian faith, virtue and charity." Alamo, 471 U.S. at 292. For a further explanation of 
Alamo, see supra Part II.B.2. 
211. David L. Gregory, Government Regulation of Religion Through Labor and 
Employment Discrimination Laws, 22 STETSON L. REv. 27, 51-52 (1992) (quoting 
Alamo, 471 U.S. at 299) (alterations in original). In Alamo, the Supreme Court stated 
that "[r]eligious organizations do not have carte blanche to exploit persons employed in 
their commercial ventures." David L. Gregory, The First Amendment Religion Clauses 
and Labor and Employment Law in the Supreme Court, 1984 Term, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 1, 24 (1986). 
212. Alamo, 471 U.S. at 305-06. 
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religious autonomy.213 Had the Shaliehsabou court compelled He­
brew Home to provide overtime pay to the plaintiff, a worker who 
supervised food preparation in accordance with Jewish kosher laws, 
the finding would be easily reconcilable with the Supreme Court's 
decision in Alamo.214 Like the Alamo Foundation, Hebrew Home 
of Greater Washington is a non-profit religious organization that 
has entered the "economic arena. "215 A strong comparison can be 
made between Shaliehsabou, a supervisor in a religiously-based 
nursing home's kitchen, and the workers who were spreading the 
Christian faith for the Alamo Foundation. Thus, relieving Hebrew 
Home of its duty to pay Shaliehsabou, an employee who worked in 
exchange for compensation, would violate the Establishment 
Clause by favoring religious organizations engaged in commerce 
over similar secular organizations. 
2. Free Exercise Clause 
There exists a major distinction between imposing fair labor 
standards upon a religious organization and interfering with that 
organization's hiring choices. "Any [effort by the state] to restrict a 
church's free choice [in employing] its leaders ... constitutes a bur­
den on the church's free exercise rights."216 If such an attempt is 
made by the government, the court must resolve the free exercise 
question by applying a balancing test. The test involves "a balanc­
ing of the burden on free exercise against the 'impediment to ... 
[the state's] objectives that would flow from recognizing the 
claimed ... exemption.' "217 As previously explained, the Rayburn 
court applied the "primary duties" test218 to assess whether the 
functions of the position embody the basic purpose of the religious 
institution. If they do, then state scrutiny of the hiring process 
would raise constitutional concerns, as the state "must not foster 
'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' "219 
213. Shaliehsabou, 369 F.3d at 805 (citing Alamo, 471 U.S. at 305). 
214. It seems highly unlikely that compelling Hebrew Home to provide Shalieh­
sabou with overtime pay would affect the religious autonomy of the nursing home. 
215. It seems that Hebrew Home meets the "economic reality" test applied in 
Alamo, 471 U.S. at 294-95. 
216. Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168 
(4th Cir. 1985). 
217. [d. (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972» (alterations in 
original). 
218. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
219. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,613 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 
397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970». In Lemon, the Supreme Court proposed the following test 
for determining the validity of a statute under the Establishment Clause: "First, the 
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However, the FLSA is not concerned with hiring, and compel­
ling a religious organization to act in accordance with the FLSA 
does not implicate the First Amendment. Though it is arguable that 
Shaliehsabou's primary duties are ministerial, such a finding is of no 
consequence. The primary duties test is to be applied to employees 
seeking relief under Title VII and not to employees, like Shalieh­
sabou, staking a claim under FLSA. Application of fair labor stan­
dards to religious organizations does not compromise religious 
freedom in the same manner as would state interference with a re­
ligious organization's hiring. If application of fair labor standards 
did in fact compromise religious freedom, religious organizations 
would be entirely exempt from FLSA scrutiny, perhaps even with 
respect to non-ministerial employees. This result would be in direct 
conflict with the Supreme Court's holding in Alamo ,220 
While applying fair labor standards to religious organizations 
does impose minimal interference with an organization's labor 
practices, the application does not violate the First Amendment be­
cause the First Amendment does not operate without limitation.221 
Although individuals have the right "to believe in any religious doc­
trine," the "power to act pursuant to that belief" is limited.222 The 
Supreme Court has explained that the free exercise guarantee is 
"not violated by reasonable, nondiscriminatory regulation by" the 
government to "preserve[] peace, order and tranquility."223 In 
Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church Corp., the Seventh Circuit held 
"that the [FLSA] is ... a reasonable, nondiscriminatory regulation" 
promulgated by Congress that applied to Pilgrim Holiness Church 
Corporation ("Pilgrim Church"), an organization that prints and 
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect 
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not 
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Id. at 612-13 (quoting 
Walz, 397 U.S. at 674) (citation omitted). The application of Title VII to decisions 
regarding employment of ministerial figures violates the third factor of the Lemon test. 
Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1170. 
220. Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985). 
221. Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church Corp., 210 F.2d 879, 884 (7th Cir. 1954). 
222. Id. at 884. The court cites Gara v. United States, 178 F.2d 38, 40 (5th Cir. 
1949) to explain that "[t]he guaranty of freedom of religion ... is not a guaranty of 
immunity for violation of law." Id. In Gara, "[t]he defendant ... was found guilty of 
violating the Selective Service Act, although he believed that it was his Christian duty 
to" do so. Id.; see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (affirming a con­
viction for bigamy even though the defendant insisted it was his religious duty to marry 
his second wife). 
223. Mitchell, 210 F.2d at 885 (citing Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 
(1953». 
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disseminates religious materia1.224 The court noted that the FLSA 
was intended to protect "the welfare of all workers, and that [apply­
ing] the provisions of the Act to" religious corporations would not 
violate the First Amendment.225 Arguably, the fact that Shalieh­
sabou filed suit to assert his rights under the FLSA makes his case 
more compelling than that of Pilgrim Church's workers. Both 
Shaliehsabou and the Pilgrim Church employees were spreading re­
ligious faith. Yet, Pilgrim Church "filed affidavits made by several 
of its employees indicating that they ... had accepted [their posi­
tions] in the belief that they were doing religious work," thereby 
accepting the inapplicability of the FLSA.226 In contrast, Shalieh­
sabou expected the protection of fair labor standards despite his 
ministerial role, and asserted his right by filing suit. Strong factual 
comparisons can be drawn between Mitchell and Shaliehsabou, and 
it seems that if the Fourth Circuit had considered the persuasive 
reasoning of the Seventh Circuit, it likely would have held that 
Shaliehsabou, a kitchen supervisor in a nursing home with a 
predominantly Jewish population, was a protected employee under 
the FLSA. 
CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Circuit's decision to recognize a ministerial excep­
tion to the FLSA permits religious organizations to exploit workers 
who were intended to be protected against unfair labor practices. 
Under this decision, religious organizations have been vested with 
an unfair economic advantage, in that they will be able to hire 
cheap labor. This is precisely the problem that the FLSA was de­
signed to prevent. 
Although the government walks a fine line when it interferes 
with religion, fair labor standards impose a minimal burden, if any, 
on free exercise of religion. Fair labor standards merely impose ec­
onomic rules; they do not affect a religious organization's inher­
ently private hiring criteria. Although the First Amendment's 
Religion Clauses embody constitutional rights, fair labor standards 
serve equally compelling interests. The critical role of fair labor 
standards is especially evident when considered in light of our com­
mercial, economically-driven society and the value placed upon 
224. [d. 
225. [d. 
226. [d. Despite the employees' affidavits, the court still held the FLSA to be 
applicable to the Pilgrim Church. [d. at 885. 
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these concerns. Religious organizations that have entered the eco­
nomic arena should not be shielded so that they may take advan­
tage of workers and receive unfair advantages in a competitive 
market. Imposing fair labor standards hardly jeopardizes the con­
stitutionally protected autonomy of a religious organization. As 
Congress has instructed, the judiciary must protect workers who are 
at risk of exploitation by applying the FLSA broadly to protect 
those who are clearly within its scope. 
Sarah L. Santos* 
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